

A Preliminary Bibliography on Distributive Politics

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Abstract

I have collected books and articles dealing with the question of (re)distribution of economic resources examined from a political economy perspective. In my mind, this point of view complements nicely older and different avenues and traditions of research on that set of issues. First, there is a long tradition in philosophy and welfare economics focusing on the meaning of notions like distributive justice and fairness and aiming to derive axiomatic characterizations of the various concepts in competition. Second, in economics and statistics, the measurement issues related to these questions have generated a voluminous literature mostly driven by the concern of producing quantitative evaluations on inequality, poverty, income and social mobility and more. Third, a more theoretical branch has explored the implications on distribution of various constraints among which informational constraints and the potential adverse effects of a too generous redistributive program on the functioning of the private sector.

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